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R e s u m e n
En este artículo se analiza el cambio de los espacios públicos de comunicación 
en el mundo árabe y su conexión con las redes sociales durante los 
acontecimientos revolucionarios recientes, especialmente, en Túnez y 
Egipto. El desprestigio del poder estuvo ligado al desprestigio de los medios 
tradicionales de comunicación de masas que siguieron los mecanismos 
habituales de desinformación y descrédito. En contraste, los participantes 
en las revueltas respondieron con innovadoras y modernas estrategias 
narrativas de contra-desinformación y explicación. A los canales satelitales 
y los blogs de internet que prepararon la opinión pública, se añadieron las 
redes sociales que organizaron las acciones concretas potenciadas por twitter 
y la expansión del teléfono móvil. La apropiación de los nuevos soportes 
por parte de los jóvenes, dándoles una conciencia de grupo para galvanizar 
el sentimiento colectivo de frustración y su utilización como elemento de 
conexión inmediata entre miles de activistas, hizo triunfar un movimiento 
gracias a la inmediatez, la sorpresa y el encadenamiento rápido de acciones. 
A b s t r a c t
In this article we shall analyse the change in the public spaces of 
communication in the Arab world and its connection with the social networks 
during the recent revolutionary events in Tunisia and Egypt. The prestige of 
power linked to the discrediting of traditional mass media, following the 
usual mechanisms of disinformation and discredit. In contrast, participants 
in the riots responded with innovative and modern narrative strategies to 
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Internet blogs prepared by public opinion have been joined by the social 
networks, which have organised specific actions, aided by Twitter and the 
spread of the mobile telephone. Young people’s appropriation of the new 
media, giving them a group awareness that galvanises the collective feelings 
of frustration and using them as a way of immediately connecting thousands 
of activists, has led the movement to prevail thanks to immediacy, surprise 
and the rapid unfolding of actions. The novel development has been both 
inter-class connection and the speed of action. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n :  T h e  L o s s  o f  P r e s t i g e 
o f  t h e  Tr a d i t i o n a l  M e d i a
The traditional media (newspapers, radio and television) controlled by the 
powers that have pursued their usual strategy in the recent Arab uprisings, 
which reflect the mechanisms of a pre-digital analogical world: at first 
hiding these events, then downplaying them, and finally condemning them 
as minority demonstrations by hot-headed violent groups and terrorists. 
Secondly, they accuse foreigners and other countries of organising the 
uprisings counter to the national spirit, which is in favour of the regime. 
And finally, they accuse the demonstrators of chaos were organised by the 
police forces or criminals released for the occasion.
The result was the total loss of prestige of the word of not needed powers 
that be, which was not even believed by the defenders of the regime. 
Everyone knew that the information issued in the traditional channels was a 
lie. In contrast, the entire population, even those who were at first in favour 
of the powers that be, ended up seeking the truth in the alternative news 
media made available via satellite dishes and the Internet.
Therefore, the response was also coordinated by alternative media to 
responds to these attacks by the official media:
1. Showing their messages in a ridiculous light
2. Demonstrating that the participants in the demonstrations were Egyptians (this 
required them to show their faces in videos posted on YouTube)
3. Trying as much as possible to ensure that the abuses by the government 
henchmen did not unleash greater evil (in Egypt the most serious case was the 
attack on the National Museum of Antiquities), all of this in a city, Cairo, that is 
usually chaotic (Rodenbeck, 1998).
In this sense, the war of information and counter-information was similar 
to what took place during the fall of the Eastern European regimes in 1989. 
However, the comparison ends here. This study points out the fundamental 
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differences with what happened during the fall of the house of cards in the 
socialist countries. There are four totally different features: the different 
state of the media in each case; the departure of a centralised Soviet power; 
the different national and linguistic situations as a whole, which did not 
form a unit in Eastern Europe as they do in the Arab world; and finally, the 
different kind of organisations behind each movement. 
In those revolutions, there was no common television station that spoke a 
language understood by all the inhabitants (Radio Free America spoke English, 
which was a language exclusive to the elites), such as Al Jazeera. This is a 
television station that is understood and extends from Morocco to Indonesia, 
with 1.2 billion potential viewers; it reports like CNN and debates like BBC, but in 
Arabic; it does not filter the statements of the main players and victors, rather 
it shows them directly, speaking in the language found in this arc stretching 
between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. However, most importantly, it is 
a television station which for the first time seeks “audience as power” before 
offering “power’s opinion to the audience” (Lamloum, 2006, p. 48)
Ever since this channel was created in 1996; it became a media star thanks 
to its coverage of the invasion of Afghanistan. “Al Jazeera competes with the 
Mosque, until now, the only focal point of protest in the Middle East,” says Olfa 
Lamloum (2006, p. 116) although these centres of oral transmission had already 
been affected by radio and television, major sources of legitimacy. Now, the 
revolution is greater, and it brings significant differences compared to these 
traditional pulpits, the obsession of all states because of their control, as it 
does compared to the traditional television and, of course, radio stations.
Al Jazeera aims to have an ‘eastern’ (premeditatedly different) or different 
opinion to the ‘western’ standpoint (equally premeditated). The creation 
of ‘west’ is implicit when continuously carving out a space of opinion that 
is defined as Arabic by exclusion and that bases this news scheme on the 
advertising slogan: “The opinion and the other opinion’. In this sense, the 
system is much more BBC than CNN, although it fluctuates between both due 
to its committed nature at times (Miles, 2005). When it follows the particular 
pathway of political commitment that Qatar’s foreign policy is interested 
in (Kawakibi, 2010) and it deforms/disfigures the information, it follows 
the American model – it applies an excess of information against proven 
opinion, a sum of data that conceal the critical judgement – forgetting that a 
sphere of public opinion is not an accumulation of information but clashing 
opinions debating the news.
Al Jazeera is the most popular party in the Arab world because it shapes 
the parties and guides the changes in their language; it introduces certain 
electoral topics and eliminates others ( El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002). On 
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the other hand, its influence is pyramidal, triggering debate on issues that 
are controversial or internal in countries where it reaches its television 
audiences, such as crimes of honour (Jordan), ablation (in the Sahel and 
Horn of Africa) and the consumption of certain drugs (the Khat controversy 
in Yemen). This means that the television stations in the countries involved 
react to Al Jazeera’s declarations or reports, triggering an internal debate.
N e w  M e d i a ,  N e w  B e h a v i o u r s ,  N e w  A t t i t u d e s 
The way was paved by these channels abroad and by the changes that the 
local channels have had to make in order to keep up with the competition. 
The media have paved the way for the change that produced these uprisings, 
but they have also triggered major changes regarding how they took place. 
Satellite channels and Internet blogs that prepare and manage public 
opinion have been joined by the social networks, which plan specific actions 
with the aid of Twitter and the spread of the mobile telephone.
They are faced with a scene with new media that do not exclude the old 
ones, yet that enhance them in unheard of ways. The new media are more 
effective in the following ways:
a. The prior information that participants have through reporters situated in 
strategic places.
b. The spread of instructions for demonstration and gatherings, indicating the 
safe routes and alternative routes via GPS.
c. The viral spread of the action, which can be held at different places at the same 
time or different points in the city, even with traps and false meetings to throw 
the police off their track.
d. The immediate coordination of action and information without the need for 
heavy transmission channels.
e. The instantaneous transmission of what is happening on the movement’s 
society network to cheer on the people.
f. Transmission abroad of the events (channels like Al Jazeera which, in turn, bring 
the content of these reports back to the country).
g. Graphic information (photos, videos, etc.) on victims, people who have 
disappeared, repression, etc.
h. The rapid withdrawal of the members of the network called to participate.
These are the propositions of any classical uprising, but the media exponentially 
expand the possibilities of reporting on and managing this information.
Regarding behaviours, we can find a twofold action that radically shifts 
the archetype of the revolutionary towards the clearly Gandhian model: a 
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representation is defined of a peaceful demonstrator, and the provocations 
by the repressive forces are denounced. This game, which is constantly 
played as if it were continuously being observed by the media, is becoming 
increasingly widespread in specific filmed materials.
Attitudes are also changing by working within the new cultured, university-
educated and international Arab youths, in which women are playing a very 
active role, though one apparently hidden behind the veil.
A neologism by journalist and sociologist Allegra Stratton (2009), 
”muhayababes”, describes this new female aesthetic that joins the thinness 
of the Western model (yearned for in blockbuster films and fashion catwalks) 
which breaks with an entire aesthetic tradition by adding the Coco Chanel 
style to it, yet with the novel introduction of the veil and a new, and much 
more personal way of understanding religiosity. 
Among Arab youth,”muhayababes”, are a swath of the population which 
music and television executives target, and they are a new political and 
religious force to be reckoned with. The images in her book that reflect 
these girls smoking a cigarette, wearing a veil in a flirty way as they listen 
to a religious speech from a blend of an imam and television preacher 
whom they follow; like fans of a band represents one way of reaffirming 
tradition without losing sight of modernity (Stratton, 2009). This is a change 
which respects tradition and “the pride of belonging to a cultural-religious 
community”, yet it is novel in all its attitudes and behaviours, which are 
liberating and clearly anti-patriarchal.
Unlike in the Western world, mainly dominated by male Internet users, 
the Arab world offers quite a different perspective: the massive presence 
of blogging women with intense political activities and an active social 
presence. This group’s output boasts an extremely high intellectual level 
and examines controversial topics – often related to the struggle against 
patriarchal culture – treated with refined irony. This is a movement that 
should be not disassociated from, but inextricably intertwined with an 
overall shift in the image of women in the Arab world, which entails a break 
with the traditional Islamophobic clichés (Martin & Bessis, 2010).
Two events have fostered women’s presence on the web: the more 
reserved and family-oriented status of women in certain countries – which 
is even more accentuated in the middle and upper classes – means that 
their presence at home leads to free-time activities related to the new 
technologies. Coupled with this, the higher unemployment rates among 
female university graduates leads to the presence of a vast contingent of 
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highly educated females in this collective of Internet users and clarifies the 
high intellectual content of their contributions.
This night-time world of silent women blogging, crying into the darkness of 
their computers, is a wonderful image of a more general change in women in 
the Arab world, but it is not the only one. The change has been unconsciously 
or consciously hidden by the Western media, creating false controversies 
such as the one on the veil, that continued a perverse form of propaganda 
triggered upon the intervention in Afghanistan.
The case of Ghada Abdel Aal was significant. In 2006, she began to write 
a humorous blog1 that recounted her attempts to not marry the potential 
grooms that her mother and aunt found for her. The blog became one of 
the most widely read in Egypt, leading to a book and a television series. The 
blogger became a writer at the newspaper Al-Shorouk and published her 
book I Want to Get Married (Ghada Abdel Aal, 2010) in several countries.
A new, completely different kind of individual is being born (young male 
Internet users and young female bloggers). The new youth that was taking 
shape reflected not only the baby boom but also the new media conditions 
in which they were raised, widespread education – at least through primary 
school – that enabled them to share messages and widespread expectations 
of frustration with each other.
T h e  I n t e r - C l a s s i s m  P r o m o t e d  b y  C y b e r - C a f é s
Mobile and Internet connections were not accessible only two years ago; and 
they have made virality (spread of an action like a computer virus) possible to 
an extent unimaginable (Fauad, 2010). The analysts were wrong – and, by the 
way, they have once again erred in more recent days – when claiming that the 
presence of the Internet in homes is much lower than in the West. They have 
not taken into account the fact that most of the young Arab population uses 
cybercafés, when makes web diffusion practically universal. What we have 
instead is a development in mobile telephones comparable to the West – with 
a vast market for cards that are affordable for the majority – which have made 
possible Twitter connections and exponentially, multiplies the success of calls 
for participation in events and the speed of information minute-to-minute.
Cybercafés, the place where people without Internet at home, and many 
who do have it gather together are social meeting places and true hubs of 
communication (one street in Amman, Jordan, has entered the Guinness 
World Record for this reason). These meeting points for unemployed youths 
– or workers living in low-income homes – allow these young professionals 
with little money, to pirate the music and films that they like, as well as to 
 I want to get] زوجتأ ةزياع  1
married]. (n.d.). Retrieved 
January 25, 2011, from http://
wanna-b-a-bride.blogspot.com/
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stay in touch with their friends via the social networks, and open themselves 
up to larger networks that encompass the entire Arab world (for those who 
express themselves in Arabic) and practically the entire planet if they are 
skilful in English.
The young Khaled Said, who unleashed the events in Egypt with his death 
at the hands of the police, was arrested when he was at a cybercafé in 
Alexandria that had been turned into a holy site of the new times. Two hours 
later, his photo with his face totally destroyed raced around to millions of 
people, who in turn showed and sent it.
The bloggers in the Arab world are not the members of the idle generation 
of unemployed Western youth who have endless possibilities for rubbish-
entertainment like the ones afforded by the Western neoliberal societies. Here 
we do not find macro-discos, drunken street parties, weekends that begin 
on Thursday, etc. Many of them are married and have a family, just like the 
Google professional who took up the torch left by the deceased Khaled Said.
The connection between both kinds of demands (economic-social and 
political) makes an inter-class alliance possible: middle class youths with 
fundamental political demands yet with an empathetic relationship with 
societal demands; working class youths who do not limit themselves 
to a traditional “daily bread uprising” rather include political demands 
as necessary to attain this objective. This alliance, would not have been 
possible without the success of the cybercafés, which allow working-class 
youths to access the Internet and reveal how deceitful the access figures 
shown by statistics based on the home computer, not on real users, are.
Several years ago, the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi developed 
the idea of the cyber-umma (Valenzuela, 2003) to define the virtual space 
of debate that was being created in the Arab world and its inter-class 
nature. This space was determined by the combination of the new satellite 
technologies in Arabic, the social networks on the Internet, and the novelty 
of mobile telephones, all of which helped to shape the new system. 
From all of this, we can extract a shared definition of Internet users common 
to all citizens that appropriate and use – and are used by – the new 
technologies: a person who is alone and yet connected at the same time 
(Perceval & Simelio, 2006). A new kind of rugged individualism with some sort 
of empathy that flees from grand ideologies – the ‘light causes’, as Lipovetsky 
(2013) puts it – but rejects the imposition of the system by creating new 
heroes from hacker culture like Lisbeth Salander and Julian Assange, on the 
boundary between the legal and the illegal. This schizophrenic relationship 
with the new media leads to a reasonable loss in the sense of reality that the 
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powers that be fabricate (the famous thesis of ‘the order of things’ espoused 
by Foucault (1966), a philosopher who is being revived in these circumstances 
where the order of the discourse has become a series of neurotic utterances). 
T h e  E m p a t h e t i c  D e t o n a t o r s 
a n d  V i r a l i t y  o f  t h e  N e w  W e b  M e d i a 
The new technological media have not created the revolution, they have 
not caused the underlying unrest and even less are they the heroes that 
have triumphed over the dictatorships in the first technological revolution 
in history as some media have declared. The heroes/heroines are those who 
have fought in the shadows, using these media, until they have achieved the 
downfall of the tyrants. 
The appropriation of the new media by young people, giving them a group 
consciousness beyond the sociological mark of being the desperate children 
of the Arab baby boom, their practice – unheard of in the West – of galvanising 
the collective sense of frustration, and using it as an element of immediate 
connection among thousands of activities, has indeed led the movement 
to triumph, achieving this through its immediacy, surprise and the rapid 
unfolding of actions. At the same time, the Internet movement has triggered 
an effect of inter-class cohesion which we shall now study, joining – in a way 
that did not happen in France in ’68 (Gallissot, 1990) – economic and social 
demands with political ones. (Bessinger et al., 2013)
Not only have the dictatorial powers that were overcome by the movement, 
caught by surprise, so were the very opposition politicians themselves, 
purportedly organised in their respective countries – including the Islamists 
in particular, Arab and Western thinkers, the Western political regimes – 
including Israel, with pathetic action by the European dis-Union. At the 
same time, the speed of these events has meant that the countries in the 
zone have adopted contradictory postures at each moment which fit in with 
a movement that is somehow reminiscent of the revolutionary waves in 
Europe in 1830, 1848 and 1870.2 
What was clear was the general sensation of dissatisfaction by intellectual 
elites constantly cast aside by Europe in their aims to instigate democratic 
changes under the excuse of realpolitik (Perceval, 2007) (authoritarian 
regimes in exchange for barriers to Islamism, corrupt dealings with these 
regimes and xenophobic-ethnocentrist disparagement of a possible internal 
democratic revolution).
2  At that time, the progressive 
bourgeois elites communicated 
through correspondence and a 
very fragile network of printed 
newspapers.
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History is necessary, and it has been the detonator of the start, the transversal 
that has joined people and the final symbol. Symbolism has been very present 
from the start, providing the uprising with emotional content, aiding in the 
adhesion of those absent, shaping a mythology of the nascent revolution. 
This has been expressed by shrugging off the bureaucratic partisan language 
of the traditional leftist organisations or Islamists far from the new models, 
and replaced by a media-oriented, empathetic language of a TV series or 
CNN news, sometimes, however, alternating with a tragicomic humour.
This cocktail is what has existed from the start as the engine and coordination 
– no, organisation – of the uprising, putting an end to the old schemes: 
traditional parties, religious or secular human rights organisations; trade 
unions and civil organizations... overcome by this rash of grassroots 
economic-social claims and ideological claims from the university bloggers.
The novel development has been both the inter-class connection – need to 
shift from a simple subsistence uprising to a revolution that aims to change 
the prevailing power system – and the speed of the action. This has only 
been possible thanks to the virality made possible by the digital system and 
the multiple devices used in it. It does not matter if an uprising occurs in 
an isolated place if it is connected with the overall network of the uprising.
C o n c l u s i o n s :  F r o m  I d e n t i t y  t o  t h e  ‘ P r i d e 
o f  B e i n g ’ ,  f r o m  O r g a n i z a t i o n  t o  C o o r d i n a t i o n 
There has been a shift from identity to the “pride of being or belonging to a 
community”, from tradition as interpreted by secular or religious leaders to 
a modern, liquid personality that is respectful of memory. An appropriation 
has been made not only of the new technological media but also the religious 
traditions and thinking. The underlying inferiority complex of victimhood 
and the aggressive dynamic of the claims have been banished.
From an Arabism with a persecution complex (obsessed by the Western 
conspiracy, imperialism or Zionism) there has been a shift to a practical 
Arabism of a generation that writes and thinks in Arabic, handles it skilfully 
and applies it to their literary or musical, religious or political, professional 
or everyday creations. There has been a shift from sacralised language to 
practical, creative speech.
Coordination without organization does not mean disorganisation; it can 
be the polar opposite. The strategy pursued in the Egyptian revolution 
demonstrates this:
3  “We are all Khaled Said” (n.d.). 
Retrieved January 25, 2011, from 
http://www.facebook.com/
elshaheeed.co.uk
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On the 25th of January 2011, there was a group that already knew what it 
wanted and had a specific strategy. The group, called “We are all Khaled 
Said”3, whose visible head is the Google executive Wael Ghonin, spearheaded 
a committee made up of the liberal professionals from the 6th of April 
Movement, the most mature members of the El-Baradei Campaign, the 
organization of the Democratic Front and Justice and Liberty Parties along 
with the youth groups from the Muslim Brotherhoods.
The coordination took place on three fronts: the internal cohesion of the 
group, attempts to encompass all the sensibilities to the utmost, and the 
staged representation of this consensus to put an end to the tyranny and 
bring forth democracy.
The initial meetings scheduled on Facebook took shape in specific plans of 
actions to be conducted. The day of the large demonstration, the different 
groups carried maps with different routes to prevent failure owing to the 
police forces. At the same time, rumours were spread about demonstrations 
at Mustafa Mahmud mosque in the upper-middle class neighbourhood of 
Mohandisin, which threw the police off their track. In addition, the action 
was focused on encouraging the adhesion of the different working class 
neighbourhoods in Cairo in order to get them to join it by launching slogans 
about the high cost of living, the rise in food prices and salaries.
The displays of national unity, which were inter-class and inter-religious, 
pacifistic and moderate, were perfectly articulated. It was necessary to 
counteract the counter-information and manipulation being issued by the 
powers that be, via the traditional media they controlled. The way Tahrir 
Square was distributed, the geolocation of the different aspects in specific 
places – which could be visited and portrayed – the perfectly orchestrated, 
utter order that worked to project what was taking place there.... At the same 
time, each group had to moderate its tendency or partisan expressions: not 
only did the Islamist hallmarks vanish, so did those of the Marxist, liberal or 
traditional union groups. Everything was planned as a display of legitimacy: 
the new Egypt was in the square, the square was a microcosm of Egypt. The 
cleaning of the square at the end was the peak of this display which moved 
the entire world. What was surprising was the success of this threefold 
action. Where hundreds of people were expected, thousands showed up.
Young people, who the media started by describing as “depoliticised”, had 
orchestrated a political change. They were not depoliticised but non-organized 
in the traditional sense of the word (in parties or social movements with 
hierarchical chains of command), and they still are. They have united around 
a shared objective. What has made these movements triumph is a cocktail 
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of inter-classism, an overcoming of the old ways (old party structures and 
human rights organisations) and sound coordination. It seems that these 
ingredients are not working in some places and yielding results in others.
The shift from ‘organization’ to ‘coordination’ does not mean chaos and can 
be highly disciplined. Sometimes organisation can kill or slow down action. 
Coordination is more consensual; it unites diverse groups and allows for 
flexibility around specific objectives that are an end unto themselves and 
not milestones along an organisation’s longer trajectory. Sociological change 
would be allowed by the general consensus of this cyber-umma that Fatima 
Mernissi (2007) spoke about, which is much less ideological, very lightly 
tinged with Arabism but much more powerful because of it as it is transversal 
and consensual in interests with all the young people with middle and higher 
education from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf (Valenzuela, 2011).
The old slogans of the powers that be against the foreign ‘other’ have 
ended. There is an overall consensus that democracy (or more accurately, 
social democracy, which is a state governed by the rule of law and a welfare 
state) is the only pathway to development after years of the merger of the 
authoritarian kleptocracy and economic neo-liberalism.
A poster in Tahrir Square bore a message in the ’68 style of many of these 
slogans: “We are not the Others, we are You”. Perhaps that is a good summary 
of what these young Internet users who have organised the revolutionary 
movement have striven for – and achieved.
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